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Two Approaches to Stakeholder Identification* 
ALEXANDER W. CAPPELEN** 
The paper presents two fundamentally different ways to approach the identification of stakeholders. 
The first is the relationship approach. According to this approach, special obligations arise between 
individuals or groups only if a specific relationship exists between them. The rival approach is the 
assignment approach. This approach challenges the claim that obligations only arise if a particular 
relationship exists between the company and a group. It holds that the distribution of responsibilities 
should be viewed as a set of pragmatic rules derived from general moral considerations. The paper 
discusses the extent to which these two approaches can justify the main features of the traditional 
stakeholder model. 
Keywords: Stakeholder theory, special obligations, Corporate Social Responsibility. 
1. Introduction 
One of the most fundamental ethical questions is the question of whom we have obli-
gations towards. The normative stakeholder theory provides a partial answer to this 
question. In contrast to the shareholder theory, as it is presented by for example 
Friedman (1970), it holds that companies have an obligation to take into account the 
interest of other actors than the shareholders. According to the stakeholder theory, 
the ultimate purpose of a company is to serve the interest of those who are identified 
as “stakeholders” (Evan/Freeman 1993). The stakeholder theory typically identifies a 
list of stakeholders, shareholders, employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the 
local community. These are all groups of individuals who interact with the company 
and who are vulnerable to the decisions made by the company. Some have argued that 
stakeholders are “those groups or individuals with whom the organization interacts or 
has interdependencies” and “any individual or group who can affect or is affected by 
the actions, decisions, policies, practices or goals of the organization” (Carroll 1993: 
60).  
Interdependence can, however, only be a partial answer to the question of who a 
company has obligations towards. Interdependence or vulnerability is not a sufficient 
condition to justify the traditional list of stakeholders. Several groups that are vulner-
able to the decisions made by a company, such as its competitors or potential employ-
ees, are typically not considered to be stakeholders. Furthermore, the standard stake-
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holder theory does not explain why interaction or vulnerability should be a source of 
obligations. In order to identify stakeholders, and to evaluate the traditional list of 
stakeholders, we need to have a theory that explains whether or not a group has a 
claim on a company. Using the definition suggested by Donaldson and Preston 
(1995), it is necessary to develop a normative stakeholder theory that deals with the 
reasons why companies ought to consider stakeholder interests even in the absence of 
any apparent benefit. 
In this paper I shall argue that there are two fundamentally different ways to approach 
the identification of stakeholders and to justify stakeholder rights and the correspond-
ing obligations on the part of the company. The first is what I call the relationship ap-
proach. According to this approach special obligations arise between individuals or 
groups if there is a specific relationship between them. This would appear to be a 
promising approach to stakeholder identification within the stakeholder model. The 
first part of this essay analyzes whether different variants of the relationship approach 
can provide a plausible justification for the list of groups commonly identified as 
stakeholders. I then examine a rival approach which I call the assignment approach. This 
approach challenges the claim that obligations only arise if a particular relationship 
exists between the company and a group. It stresses that the distribution of responsi-
bilities should be viewed as a set of pragmatic rules derived from general moral con-
siderations. This second section of the essay discusses how the assignment approach 
can be used to justify the main feature of the stakeholder model.  
2. The relationship approach 
The relationship approach views a company’s responsibility, and the corresponding 
rights of stakeholder groups, as deriving from special duties that we have toward per-
sons or groups to whom we have particular relationships.1 To defend the view that a 
company has special obligations towards a particular group of stakeholders one has to 
argue that the relationship between the company and the stakeholder group gives rise 
to special obligations. I discuss three traditions that fall within the relationship ap-
proach: the voluntarist tradition, the mutual benefit tradition, and the communitarian tradition. 
The common feature of these traditions is that they hold that we have, or could have, 
different and more extensive obligations toward particular individuals if we stand in a 
special relationship to these individuals. However, they disagree about what type of 
relationship that is morally relevant. 
2.1 The Voluntarist Tradition 
According to the voluntarist tradition, mere participation in a relationship or interde-
pendency, is not sufficient to give rise to special responsibilities. Special obligations 
only arise from voluntary and informed agreements or contractual relationships. The 
best-known voluntarist tradition is libertarianism (see for example Nozick 1974). Ac-
cording to this theory all individuals have certain basic liberties or rights, such as the 
________________________ 
1 I use the term special duties in a broad sense, so as to include obligations that derive from voluntary 
agreements or contracts. 
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right to life and health, to property, and to liberty. These rights constitute the bounds 
of individual freedom of action that people cannot transgress. Individuals have these 
rights irrespective of the existence of any particular relationship or institutional struc-
ture. In the absence of any voluntary agreements, the only obligation we have towards 
other individuals is the negative duty not to violate their basic rights. Positive obliga-
tions between individuals might be legitimate only if they are voluntarily agreed and 
the agreement did not violate any individual rights. Clearly, what constitutes a volun-
tary agreement is a pivotal question within the voluntarist tradition. In particular it is 
important whether only formal contracts should be viewed as the appropriate type of 
agreement or if less explicit types of consent might be viewed as voluntary agreement.  
The shareholder theory, as it is presented by Friedman (1970), is a good example of a 
voluntarist theory. According to Friedman, managers have an obligation to maximize 
shareholder value because the managers have voluntarily agreed to promote the inter-
est of the owners. A similar contract does not exist between the managers and other 
stakeholders. If only formal contracts should be viewed as the appropriate type of 
voluntary agreement this explains the asymmetry between the shareholders and other 
stakeholders. The only obligations a company has towards its employees or its cos-
tumers are those specified by contracts and by the law in the country of operation. 
However, the voluntarist tradition conforms somewhat better with the stakeholder 
theory if one argues that less explicit types of consent should be considered as a basis 
for special obligations. It could be argued that if a company voluntary enters into a 
relationship with some stakeholders they also tacitly accept certain obligations in addi-
tion to those specified by formal contracts. This could for example explain why firms 
have certain obligations towards their employees and their costumers beyond those 
that are specified by the law or by formal contracts. The fact that some types of inter-
dependency are not a result of voluntary agreements would also explain why some 
groups that a company interacts with, such as its competitors, should no be consid-
ered as stakeholders.  
However, as a basis for the stakeholder theory and as a justification for the traditional 
list of stakeholders, the voluntarist view has its obvious limitations. The relationship 
between the company and some of the traditional stakeholders, such as the local 
community, cannot be seen as a result of a voluntary agreement because the stake-
holders often do not have any way to avoid the interaction. Furthermore, many would 
object to the premise in the voluntarist tradition that obligations towards stakeholders 
would have to be accepted voluntarily by the company.  
2.2 The Mutual Benefit Tradition 
David Hume, and more recently John Rawls and David Gauthier, have characterized 
the existence and necessity of social cooperation as part of the “circumstances of jus-
tice” (Hume 1748/1986: 145-153; Rawls 1971: 126-130; Gauthier 1985: 10-14).  Ac-
cording to this tradition a society should be understood as “a co-operative venture for 
mutual advantages” marked with both: identity of interests and conflict (Rawls 1971: 
126). Social cooperation enables a better life for everyone through the increase in 
production that results from joining forces. But there are also conflicts of interests, as 
everyone prefers a larger to a lesser share of the benefits produced by their coopera-
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tion. This tradition is a relationship approach in the sense that obligations arise from a 
particular relationship: cooperation in order to create a social surplus. These obliga-
tions exist even if the relationship is not voluntary and the existence of obligations 
does not presuppose any voluntary agreement between the participants. According to 
the mutual benefit tradition, distribution should therefore take place among the par-
ticipants in social cooperation. A crucial question within this tradition is how the con-
cept of social cooperation is construed. The answer to this question affects both: who 
are seen as participants in social cooperation and what is considered the social surplus 
to be divided among the participants. 
If social cooperation is interpreted narrowly as economic cooperation the mutual 
benefit tradition implies that only economic interaction give rise to special obligations 
among the participants. This interpretation seems to correspond well with the tradi-
tional list of stakeholders. Owners, employees, costumers and suppliers engage in 
economic cooperation. It also provides a possible explanation of why certain groups, 
such as competitors, are not included despite the fact that they interact with the firm. 
However, it does not give a convincing justification of including the local community 
among the stakeholders because there need not be any economic transactions between 
the firm and the local community. Furthermore, it does not explain why only groups 
that cooperate directly with the firm should be included among the stakeholders. Why 
should the firms’ suppliers but not the suppliers of the suppliers be included in the list 
of stakeholders? Given the interdependency of the world economy, the list of stake-
holders would obviously become very long even if we interpret social cooperation 
merely as economic cooperation. 
The main challenge to the mutual benefit tradition as a basis for stakeholder identifi-
cation is how to interpret the notion of social cooperation. For some writers, such as 
Rawls, the society as a whole, not just its economy, should be conceived as a coopera-
tive scheme from which everyone receives a wide range of economic and non-
economic benefits. Given this interpretation of social cooperation, the mutual benefit 
tradition would also identify participation in the same political jurisdiction as a source 
of stakeholder obligations. 
2.3 The Communitarian Tradition 
According to the communitarian tradition an individual is partly defined by his rela-
tionships and the various rights and obligations that go along with them, so these 
commitments themselves form a basic element of personality (Miller 1988: 648). 
Rights and obligations are therefore, at least partly, defined between members of par-
ticular societies or communities at particular times.2 The morally relevant type of con-
nection is therefore social and/or cultural. To the extent that a person has other and 
more extensive obligations toward individuals within the same community, communi-
tarians would argue that delimitation of fiscal jurisdictions should correspond to such 
communities. Again, two important and difficult questions within this tradition arise: 
________________________ 
2  Most communitarians would accept that there exist moral constraints on our behavior with respect to 
persons outside our group, but maintain that these are of a different or less extensive kind than are 
those toward members of our community. 
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how is this concept of community construed and what type of attachments and loyal-
ties constitutes a community. 
Several of the traditional stakeholders, such as the employees and the local community 
are typically parts of the same social and cultural community. It is often assumed that 
an individual would generally be a member of the community where she resides. If 
this assumption is correct, the communitarian tradition could be seen as justifying of a 
company’s obligations towards the local community in which it operates and towards 
its employees.  
The main problem with using the communitarian tradition as a basis for the stake-
holder model is that several of the traditional stakeholder groups, such as customers 
or suppliers, do not need to be part of the same community where the company un-
dertakes its operations. Another problem is the fact that people identify with commu-
nities on different terms, resulting in a fundamental ambiguity as to how to construe 
the group within which resources should be redistributed. Given the importance most 
people attach to national and ethnic communities, the communitarian tradition is dif-
ficult to reconcile with the fact that the national community, or a society, is not in-
cluded in the list of stakeholders.  
None of the three versions of the relationship approaches outlined above seem to 
provide a convincing way to justify the traditional list of stakeholders. The voluntarist 
approach, particularly in its strict interpretation, would primarily justify the obligations 
towards owners and those stakeholders that have a contractual relationship with the 
firm, but cannot justify any obligations towards the local community or the suppliers. 
Thus, it seems exclude some of the groups included in traditional list of stakeholders. 
The mutual benefit tradition would justify a longer list of stakeholders, including all 
actors cooperating with firms. However, it would not necessarily include the local 
community among its stakeholders. Furthermore, it would include groups not tradi-
tionally considered to be among the stakeholders. In an interdependent economy 
almost all companies are cooperating. Finally, the communitarian tradition would 
explain why groups such as employees and the local community should be included 
but it cannot explain why a company should have obligations towards groups, such as 
suppliers, unless they are members of the same communities.  
The fact that the three traditions do not justify the traditional list of stakeholders 
should not necessarily be seen as an objection to such theories. It could instead be 
seen as a criticism of the traditional list of stakeholders. It is however, problematic 
that the three traditions suffer from an inherent ambiguity related to the interpretation 
of core concepts such as the concept of voluntary agreement, social cooperation and 
community. 
3. The Assignment Approach 
According to the assignment approach we have the same obligations towards every 
human independent of the relationship we have to them. Special duties should there-
fore be regarded as being only “distributed general duties” and derive the whole of 
their moral force from general duties (Goodin 1988: 678). The need for a moral divi-
sion of labor is in other words what explains special obligations. Writers within this 
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tradition would reject the idea that it is the presence of a morally relevant relationship 
that gives a company certain obligations towards its stakeholders. They would argue 
that responsibilities should be distributed to maximize some general moral objective, 
e.g. to maximize welfare or utility.  
There is a tension between cosmopolitan moral theories such as utilitarianism and 
particularist theories such as the stakeholder theory. The assignment approach, or the 
assigned responsibility model as Robert Goodin (1988) calls it, can potentially reduce 
such tension. Goodin (1995: 282) argues that “a great many general duties point to 
tasks that, for one reason or another, are pursued more effectively if they are subdi-
vided and particular people are assigned special responsibility for particular portions 
of the task”. Often this has to do with the advantage of specialization and division of 
labor (Shue 1988). At other times, it has to do with informational requirements of 
doing a good job in helping others. The fact that we are limited altruists, i.e. that we 
care about a limited number of people, constitutes another argument for delimitation 
of obligations. 
Identification of stakeholders might thus be understood as a pragmatic way to assign 
responsibility for discharging certain general duties vis-à-vis individuals to particular 
companies. This way of assigning duties is obviously not randomly chosen, and nei-
ther should the identification of stakeholders be. We would want to avoid waste and 
inefficiency in the implementation of our general duties. A particular delimitation of 
stakeholders is only justified to the extent that it assigns responsibility in the most 
efficient way. This implies that obligations should be assigned to the agent who is in 
the best position to fulfill the obligations. A company has special obligations towards 
a particular actor if the company is in a better position than other agents, e.g., the 
government, to discharge the general duties. The assigned responsibility model can 
thus explain why it is groups that interact with a company, and which therefore are 
vulnerable to its decisions, that are included among its stakeholders. It makes obvious 
sense that a company is assigned some responsibility for its employees and costumers 
since the company is in a better position to take account of their interests than most 
other actors.  
Even if the assigned responsibility model to some extent reconciles the cosmopolitan 
nature of general obligations with the stakeholder model, it can also be used to criti-
cize the traditional list of stakeholders. A characteristic feature of the stakeholder 
model is that considerations of income distribution do not have any role in the distri-
bution of stakeholder rights. The assignment approach would challenge this feature of 
the stakeholder model based on what we could call the distributional objection. In its 
general version this objection points out that benefits arising from special relation-
ships might work to the disadvantage of those who are most in need (Scheffler 1997). 
This effect is easily seen in the context of corporate responsibility. The rich members 
of the world’s population are more closely connected with each other--through eco-
nomic cooperation, co-residence, and citizenship--than with the poor. If the stake-
holder rights are delimited to groups constituted by such relationships, the result will 
be that rich people take responsibility for rich people and poor people take responsi-
bility for poor people and this is not necessarily an efficient way to divide moral labor. 
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4. Conclusion 
Interdependency cannot be a sufficient condition for the existence of stakeholder 
obligations. Is there any other type of relationship that can explain the traditional list 
of stakeholders? In this paper I have discussed three possible types of relationships; 
contractual, economic, and social. Important traditions in moral philosophy identify 
these relationships as the basis for special obligations. However, these traditions do 
not succeed in justifying the traditional list of stakeholders. One response to this could 
be to revise the list of stakeholders. Another response could be to abandon the rela-
tionship approach and the search for a unique relationship as a basis for stakeholder 
obligations. In many ways the assignment approach is a more promising way to justify 
stakeholder obligations than the relationship approach. According to this approach, 
stakeholder obligations should be seen as a pragmatic way to share moral labor be-
tween different actors. This would explain the importance attached to interdepen-
dency in the traditional list of stakeholders without claiming that it is the existence of 
interdependency as such that gives rise to the obligations. 
The assignment approach also seems to be better suited to handle the fact that com-
panies operate under very different economic, social, and political contexts and that 
these conditions affect the type of obligations they have. It can for example explain 
why companies have special responsibilities when they operate in developing coun-
tries. If stakeholder obligations are seen as general duties that are assigned to the 
agents most capable of fulfilling them, it makes sense to assign more obligations to 
companies in countries in which the government is weak and/or unwilling to take 
their part of the obligations. 
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